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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for policing is a hot topic. This is not 
only because of the hopes and promises placed in it, but also because it is sharply 
criticized by human rights activists, ethicists and social scientists.1 In particular, 
the use and implementation of so-called predictive policing technologies (PPT) 
is being disapproved of by many entities. The criticism of these systems refers to 
some of its well-known aspects, such as lack of accountability, problematic biases 
in the data sets, intrusion into personal rights, and superficiality. Despite the 
criticism, PPTs are now regularly used across criminal justice and law 
enforcement institutions. Judges, parole boards, police commanders, and patrol 
officers make daily assessments, evaluations, and assignments based on these 
technologies. They insist that automated data analysis makes institutional 
decision-making more effective, consistent, neutral, and, most importantly, it 
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 1.  See generally ACLU et al., Predictive Policing Today: A Shared Statement of Civil Rights 
Concern (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/other/statement-concern-about-predictive-policing-aclu-
and-16-civil-rights-privacy-racial-justice [https://perma.cc/52PY-4Q57] (discussing concerns with 
predictive policing tools employed by law enforcement). 
 2.  See Eric Siegel, How to Fight Bias with Predictive Policing, SCI. AM. (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/voices/how-to-fight-bias-with-predictive-policing/ 
[https://perma.cc/9SVD-255P] (explaining how predictive policing presents an opportunity to advance 
social justice if it is “done right”). 
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What does the term “smart policing” mean in this context? While most 
definitions focus on the technical tools involved,3 police practitioners Nola Joyce, 
Charles Ramsey, and James Stewart, as well as information scientist Walter Perry 
and others offer both a broader and deeper understanding by defining “smart 
policing” as investigations that, through the close collaboration between 
researchers, practitioners, and technology developers, apply an analytical lens to 
tackle the root causes of crime.4 According to these authors, policing that is 
“smart” in this sense should be the goal that guides innovation and reform. What 
makes policing “smart” is not only its quantitative efficiency, but also its 
qualitative sensitivity. Smart policing should be attentive to its potentials, but also 
to its threats and risks, as well as its cultural and historical context. Smart policing 
should also not rely on exclusion, enforcement, and demarcation, but use 
technical tools to promote the mutual inclusion of competing groups, trust in 
government, and participation in society.5 
In this conception, it is not simply the use of an algorithm that makes policing 
“smart.” Rather, it is the embedding of the algorithm, its tasks, its applications, 
its utility functions, and its (long-term) impact on individuals and societies that 
make the difference. AI-based predictive policing as we know it today has little 
to do with “smart policing” in this broader sense. Current PPTs are not designed, 
let alone systematically deployable, to analyze data on the much more complex 
underlying structures of crime. They are only capable of performing rather simple 
tasks, such as designating areas for street patrols. Their aim is to predict and thus 
help prevent overt offenses such as street robbery, burglary, the use and sale of 
illegal drugs, or theft.6 But what about organized crime, which, according to 
Interpol, remains one of the greatest threats to contemporary democracies 
because it systematically destroys small businesses and corrodes trust in 
democratic institutions?7 This form of crime is mostly based on strategies of 
 
 3.  See James R. Coldren, Alissa Huntoon & Michael Medaris, Introducing Smart Policing: 
Foundations, Principles and Practice, 16 POLICE Q. 275, 275–284 (2013) (defining smart policing and 
outlining characteristics in local smart policing sites). 
 4.  See generally Nola M. Joyce, Charles Ramsey & James Stewart, Commentary on Smart Policing, 
16 POLICE Q. 358 (2013) (focusing on research partnership and collaborative problem solving in smart 
policing); WALTER L. PERRY, BRIAN MCINNIS, CARTER C. PRICE, SUSAN C. SMITH & JOHN S. 
HOLLYWOOD, PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OPERATIONS (2013) (detailing the analytical techniques and tactical approaches available in predictive 
policing). 
 5.  For a more in-depth analysis, see JACQUES RANCIÈRE, DISSENSUS: ON POLITICS AND 
AESTHETICS 36 (2010). 
 6.  See Aaron Shapiro, Predictive Policing for Reform? Indeterminacy and Intervention in Big Data 
Policing, 17 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 456, 456–72 (2019). 
 7.  According to Interpol, the N’drangetha, with an annual turnover of 53 billion euros, and 
chapters in forty-three countries, is the most powerful criminal organization in the world. It is so 
immensely successful precisely because it avoids any kind of visible and hence easily detectable crime 
and instead builds on a combination of corruption, collusion, infiltration, and money laundering. 
INTERPOL, ITALY AND INTERPOL LAUNCH GLOBAL PROJECT TO COMBAT ‘NDRANGETHA (Jan. 
30, 2020), https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2020/Italy-and-INTERPOL-launch-global-
project-to-combat-Ndrangheta [https://perma.cc/J6WG-ZSJ6]. 
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corruption and collusion and avoids all forms of open violence.8 It is therefore 
unlikely to be combated by, for example, street patrols or hot-spot policing. 
Pattern recognition and crime series detection are not very useful here because 
these approaches so far address only acts of violent or well-reported and easy to 
detect crime, not subtle and complex ones such as corruption or money 
laundering.9 Therefore, other systems are urgently needed to relieve criminal 
investigators of the overwhelming task of understanding, uncovering, and 
proving complicated structures of organized crime in which money flows, politics, 
logistics, international relations, blood ties, and cultural traditions are 
dynamically interwoven. 
There is still a long way to go before we have machines capable of taking us 
significantly further in the struggle against organized crime. Recently, however, 
the pace of machine learning is accelerating. As more data is becoming available, 
the merging of heterogeneous mass data is working more smoothly than ever 
before. Moreover, visualization techniques that reduce complexity by translating 
machine language into comprehensible cues are making communication easier, 
and the development of more complex systems aimed not only at detecting 
patterns and correlations but also at analyzing causality and structure is on the 
horizon.10 Applied to the police context, this shift from patterns to structures and 
from correlation to causality opens the potential for a shift from fighting 
symptoms and individuals to fighting relations and organizations. 
The use of automation to assist in combating organized crime is certainly a 
laudable project. Nevertheless, there is reason to assume that many of the 
criticisms raised against existing PPTs could also apply against such an extension 
of the systems. This is because, although they are based on a different logic 
(instead of prediction, they rely on detection and understanding), they use similar 
statistical models, are commissioned and built by the same institutions, and are 
deployed within the same postcolonial societies. However, critical discussion and 
ethical evaluation of the potentially problematic consequences of organized 
 
 8.  See id. The most powerful of the criminal organizations today can consistently be described as 
global players. In most cases, they have executive units on several continents, which often act 
autonomously. In this respect, criminal organizations can also be compared with social swarms, operating 
without centers but following a common logic. At the same time, however, many criminal organizations 
also have local roots, and their procedures are shaped by regional specifics across national borders. See 
Letizia Paoli, The Paradoxes of Organized Crime, 37 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 51, 51–97 (2002). In this 
paper, we take as our starting point criminal organizations that have their roots in Europe, but this does 
not mean that the findings discussed here do not apply to organized crime on other continents. 
 9.  See generally Alex Chohlas-Wood & E.S. Levine, A Recommendation Engine to Aid in 
Identifying Crime Patterns, 49 INFORMS J. ON APPLIED ANALYTICS (2019) (implementing a 
recommendation algorithm called “Patternizr” to aid in identifying crime patterns); Tong Wang, Cynthia 
Rudin, Daniel Wagner & Rich Sevieri, Learning to Detect Patterns of Crime, in JOINT EUROPEAN 
CONFERENCE ON MACHINE LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY IN DATABASES (2013) 
(proposing a pattern detection algorithm). 
 10.  See generally JONAS PETERS, DOMINIK JANZIG & BERNHARD SCHÖLKOPF, ELEMENTS OF 
CAUSAL INFERENCE: FOUNDATIONS AND LEARNING ALGORITHMS (2017) (focusing on causality and 
cause-effect models); JUDEA PEARL & DANA MACKENZIE, THE BOOK OF WHY: THE NEW SCIENCE OF 
CAUSE AND EFFECT (2018) (exploring causality and causal inference). 
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crime-oriented technologies is a blind spot in the current research landscape, 
which focuses almost exclusively on PPTs. This is because more complex 
organized crime-oriented technologies are still nascent; they are not yet in use, 
so their actual impacts cannot yet be empirically evaluated. However, we do not 
want to wait until they are mature and in use to evaluate them—not only because 
it is uneconomical to build these systems first and then change them again to 
comply with ethical standards, but also because  the damage from discriminatory 
or intrusive automation can be very difficult to undo. Thus, since we have reason 
to believe that machine learning technologies for combating organized crime will 
mature and come into use sooner or later, they already deserve closer scrutiny. 
This can be realized by combining different approaches suggested within the field 
of anticipatory ethics.11 
In this Article, we take a first step in this direction. In Parts II and III, we start 
with a discussion of the inherent logic and also the criticisms that have been raised 
against current PPTs so far.  In Part IV, we continue by taking a more in-depth 
look at technologies which are “under development” that target more complex 
tasks related to combating organized crime. In this context, we explore the 
following questions: To what extent do the criticisms leveled against PPTs apply 
to these new systems? What other, potentially more far-reaching, ethical issues 
might be expected? What new challenges might arise and what potential lies in 
new approaches? In short, what will it take to make AI-based policing truly 
“smart” in a comprehensive sense? 
 
II 
THE PREDICTION PARADIGM – STATE OF THE ART 
AI is being used in several ways to improve policing and criminal 
investigations. These include crime series detection, hotspot patrols, and suspect-
based policing. They all target well-reported forms of crime for which sufficient 
past crime data are available. Most of the current approaches are subsumed and 
negotiated under the term “predictive policing”. The term “predictive” can, 
however, be misleading because it suggests that specific predictions are being 
made, when in fact most systems are about prevention, deterrence, or even 
prosecution based on statistics, analysis, and probabilities. Nonetheless, the term 
“predictive policing” has become established, and when we talk about the 
predictive policing paradigm here, we are referring to a wide variety of types of 
AI-based policing approaches that are already in use. What unites them is that 
they address forms of physically violent or otherwise visible crime, but not the 
structural activities that occur beneath the surface of the iceberg, of which 




 11.  See Phillip Brey, Anticipatory Ethics for Emerging Technologies, 6 NANOETHICS 1, 1 (2012) 
(providing a method for technology impact assessment). 
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There are several definitions of predictive policing. Most of them do not 
contradict each other, but they emphasize different aspects.12 According to one 
of the most prominent and comprehensive definitions, predictive policing can be 
summarized as: “the application of analytical techniques—particularly 
quantitative techniques—to identify likely targets for police intervention and 
prevent crime or solve past crimes by making statistical predictions.”13 This 
definition is interesting because it introduces the possibility that PPTs could be 
used not only to prevent crime but also to solve “past crimes” based on 
predictions that are usually associated with the future, not the past. How is this 
possible? Following Professor Adrian Mackenzie’s more general thoughts on the 
subject of “prediction,” the new paradigm of predictive policing —including its 
application to past crimes—is best understood by placing it in the larger context 
of machine learning today. This logic is based on the idea of feeding statistical 
models with enough data and identifying sufficient features to arrive at 
generalizations that are accurate and reliable enough to work like predictions.14 
In this understanding, predictive policing is not about actually making 
predictions, but about identifying probabilities. These probabilities may concern 
not only who is likely to commit a crime in the future (prediction), but also who 
has already committed one in the past (prosecution). 
By becoming increasingly accurate, machine learning-based forecasts 
generate what Mackenzie calls “the desire to predict.”15 Machine learning not 
only feeds this desire, but increasingly serves it through its self-reinforcing effects. 
Still, it is not 100% reliable, the system only indicates probabilities, like all other 
human decision-making mechanisms. Unlike purely human reasoning, however, 
many cases of automated decision-making suggest infallibility. Because of its 
imperfect accuracy and sometimes ideological exaggerations combined with self-
reinforcing effects, AI-driven policing has been the subject of much controversy 
over the past decade of development, testing, and application. 
 
III 
CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING PREDICTIVE POLICING 
In this Part, we provide an overview of some of the major criticisms of the 
current predictive policing approaches. PPTs shortcomings include both ethical 
issues and limitations in scope.16 Here, we have divided the criticism of PPTs into 
 
 12.  See generally Albert Meijer & Martijn Wessels, Predictive Policing: Review of Benefits and 
Drawbacks, 42 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1031 (2019) (providing an overview of the “existing literature on 
the benefits and drawbacks of predictive policing). 
 13.  PERRY, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 14. See Adrian Mackenzie, The Production of Prediction: What Does Machine Learning Want?, 18 
EUR. J. CULTURAL STUD. 329, 433 (2015) (the paper highlights several interlinked modes of machine 
generalization). 
 15.  Id. at 432. 
 16.  To this end, we conducted a literature review based on a 5-step process: selection of key papers 
for closer examination, identification of discursive patterns, analysis of key controversies, the search for 
empirical evidence/rebuttals of criticisms (discursive openings and closings), and the identification of 
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three major categories. First, PPTs rely on data taken from past police records 
which may present significant privacy concerns and result in perpetuating 
institutional discrimination within law enforcement practices. Second, PPT 
algorithms can be difficult for law enforcement practitioners and the public to 
understand and they can provide a misleading sense of certainty known as 
“mathwashing.” And finally, the “paradox of prediction” introduces the problem 
that if PPTs successfully predict and prevent crime, then eventually the data they 
are based on will no longer provide accurate predictions. These criticisms serve 
as the basis for Part IV, in which we assess the possibilities and difficulties of 
applying these machine learning techniques to combat organized crime. 
A. Difficult Data 
The bulk of critical papers dealing with PPTs focus on the data that is being 
used to train algorithms and to produce predictions.17 For place-based policing, 
for example, meta data of recorded emergency calls from recent decades is used 
to determine future areas for hot-spot patrolling. Critics argue that such police 
data is biased in numerous ways. First, it cannot represent the many cases that 
have gone undetected. Due to this blind spot, police data alone are poorly suited 
for modeling systems that can help police achieve new success in the very areas 
where their success rates are lowest and where performance improvement is most 
needed.18 Instead, it helps police optimize their success rates in areas where their 
rates were already high (such as apprehending petty drug dealers), while further 
relegating the areas where they were least successful.19 
Second, police officers and departments regularly face empirically 
demonstrable accusations of being biased (if not racist) against people of color.20 
One would then assume that the police data used to feed the PPT algorithms 
 
derivations. To realize the review, known databases were searched, each combining three of the following 
keywords in different variations in a total of five queries: Machine Learning, Smart Policing, Predictive 
Policing, Prosecution, and Evidence. 
 17.  See Claire Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed Data, GEO. L. CTR. 
OF PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com/ [https://perma.cc/5GNY-5NR5]. 
 18.  See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2019: FULL SOURCE 
DESCRIPTION, 6 (2020), https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2019_CPI_SourceDescription_EN-
converted-merged.pdf [https://perma.cc/89DN-BPZP] (providing an estimation of the level of corruption 
in different countries and regions as well as an overview of known corruption cases and how they impact 
political integrity). 
 19.  See Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE, Oct. 2016, at 14–19 
(documenting biased data used for predictive policing systems). 
 20.  See Elizabeth E. Joh, Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data, & Algorithms, WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 287, 289, 294 (2017) (“To be sure, there have already been concerns raised that the inputs 
for policing algorithms reflect racial biases.”); William A. Geller & Hans Toch, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: 
UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 303–08 (1995) (studying the 
relationship between race and the use of force); E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The 
Consequences of Race for Police Officers’ Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCH. SCI. 180, 180 (2005) 
(“Responses to the simulation revealed that upon initial exposure to the program, the officers were more 
likely to mistakenly shoot unarmed Black compared with unarmed White suspects.”); Andrew Gelman 
et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of 
Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N (2007) (analyzing racial bias in police stops). 
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would reflect these prejudices.21 When such biased data is being used to 
determine future police work, this inevitably leads to compounding injustice 
because the built-in biases are being solidified through the self-reinforcing effects 
of automation.22 The more they patrol, the more likely they are to discover crime 
and feel their prejudices confirmed. This confirmation bias has been described as 
the vicious circle of “automated inequality.”23 
Based on the above arguments, the criticism against PPTs went viral in both 
scientific discourse and popular media. However, criticism was based only on 
theory, simulation, and anticipation. To disprove it, technology developers and 
researchers conducted several randomized field trials to test the advantages and 
disadvantages of PPTs.24 Particularly the study carried out by Jeffrey 
Brantingham himself, owner of PredPol, showed that there is actually no 
evidence that PPTs reinforce existing biases.25 However, because unfair biases 
existed before these systems were implemented, the argument remains that 
automation based on unfairly biased data sets stabilizes and confirms existing 
inequities. 
Privacy concerns pose another problem with data mining in such a sensitive 
field like criminal investigation. Police technologies attempt to protect individual 
privacy by outputting only generalizations that are approximate enough to be 
considered predictions. But data-based profiling practices have also been 
criticized because they can provide the backdrop against which people are 
discriminated based on their membership in certain groups. For example, people 
might be regularly frisked and inspected based on their algorithmic assignment 
to a group that the algorithm has identified as particularly likely to possess illegal 
weapons, traffic in illegal drugs, or commit burglary and theft.26 These 
interventions can have devastating effects not only on the social lives of the 
suspects, but on entire neighborhoods and communities.27 
 
 21.  See Michael Townsley et al., The Missing Link of Crime Analysis: A Systematic Approach to 
Testing Competing Hypotheses, 5 POLICING 158, 163–64 (2011) (presenting a method for systematically 
analyzing multiple explanations for crime problems). 
 22.  See generally Tim O’Brien, Compounding Injustice: The Cascading Effect of Algorithmic Bias in 
Risk Assessments, 13 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 1, 38–39 (2020) (“The criminal justice 
process consists of a chain of decisions that are each being increasingly influenced or automated with 
statistics and algorithms, creating a cascading effect that continues long after release and reentry.”). 
 23.  VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, 
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR, 190 (2018) (investigating the impact of policy algorithms on poor and 
working-class Americans). 
 24.  George Mohler, M.B. Short, Sean Malinowski, Mark Johnson, George Tita, Andrea L. Bertozzi 
& P. Jeffrey Brantingham, Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing, 110 J. OF THE AM. 
STAT. ASS’N 1399 (2015); Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Ralph B. Taylor, Amber P. Askey, Kevin Thomas, John 
Grasso, Kevin J. Bethel, Ryan Fisher & Josh Koehnlein, The Philadelphia Predictive Policing 
Experiment, 17 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 15 (2020). 
 25.  P. Jeffrey Brantingham, Matthew Valasik & George Mohler, Does Predictive Policing Lead to 
Biased Arrests? Results From a Randomized Controlled Trial, 5 STAT. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1–6 (2018). 
 26.  See Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 139, 139–40 (2017) 
(discussing this practice of “Suspect-Based Predictive Policing”). 
 27.  See PERRY, supra note 4. 
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Whether people are assigned to a suspicious group is largely outside their 
control. Even if they are very careful to protect their privacy, they change the fact 
that others in the group reveal much about themselves. Due to this 
interdependence of data subjects, the concept of privacy as an individual right is 
reaching its limits in the digital age.28 As a result, scholars concerned with privacy 
and surveillance are increasingly turning their attention to group privacy.29 In 
doing so, they strive to move beyond an understanding of group privacy in the 
traditional sense, according to which individuals deserve privacy protection even 
when they act within a group. Instead, they propose to shift the boundary 
between an understanding of group privacy as the privacy of individuals within a 
group and an understanding of group privacy as the privacy of the group itself.30 
Such boundary shifting is important to address the challenges posed by 
algorithmic profiling and typecasting. 
B. Opacity and Conflicts of Authority 
This strand of criticism addresses the problem of algorithmic accountability. 
While the black box architecture of many machine learning systems is often the 
focus in this context,31 predictive policing is usually based on statistical models 
that an expert in the field can easily understand.32 However, police officers, 
prosecutors, and investigators are generally not trained machine learning experts. 
Therefore, it is difficult for them to fathom how the systems they use generate 
their recommendations. This is a problem because practitioners are deprived of 
the ability to question recommendations. Also, the algorithms employed by 
commercial systems can be subject to trade secret protections. This black box 
architecture thus creates a conflict because the public has a right to transparency, 
and the way public officials interact with citizens is a matter of public interest. 
Another strand of critique deals with the phenomenon of “mathwashing.” 
Unlike the black box discourse, the “mathwashing” discourse focuses on the 
problem of opacity not primarily as a technological problem, but as an ideological 
one. “Mathwashing” refers to a worldview that classifies the results of algorithmic 
models as truths that cannot be discussed because they are mathematical.33 As 
 
 28.  See Alice E. Marwick & Danah Boyd, Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate Context in 
Social Media, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC., 1051, 1051–67 (2014) (“Although models of data sharing are 
typically understood through the lens of individual rights and controls, the networked nature of social 
media means that individuals’ experiences with their data are consistently imbricated with others.”). 
 29.  See generally Linnet Taylor, Introduction: A New Perspective on Privacy, in GROUP PRIVACY: 
NEW CHALLENGES OF DATA TECHNOLOGIES, 1, 1–12 (Linnet Taylor, Luciano Floridi & Bart van der 
Sloot eds., 2017); see also Paula Helm, Treating Sensitive Topics Online: A Privacy Dilemma, 20 ETHICS 
& INFO. TECH. 303, 303–313 (2018); see also Brent Mittelstadt, From Individual to Group Privacy in Big 
Data Analytics, 30 PHILOS. TECH. 475, 475–94 (2017). 
 30.  TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 29, at 1–15. 
 31.  See generally, FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). 
 32.  See, e.g., Chohlas-Wood & Levine, supra note 9, at 93–171 (elaborating on the concept of 
predictive policing). 
 33.  See TAYLOR WOODS, ‘Mathwashing,’ Facebook and the Zeitgeist of Data Worship, 
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such, they are seen as neutral—free of biases, errors, and irrational decisions. To 
counter the myth of the flawless machine, scholars in the field of Critical 
Algorithm Studies are drawing attention to the various forms of subjectivity and 
intention that are woven into the technologies.34  After all, the machines 
producing these predictions are the result of collective human decisions. These 
decisions include questions about what data to use, what features to select, what 
machine learning techniques to use, how to design the user interface so that it can 
be operated by non-tech savvy end users, what affordances to implement, how to 
visualize the results, and so on. Given the collective work and design decisions on 
which it is based, machine learning seems anything but neutral. Instead, it must 
be understood and treated as a power-saturated technology that serves the 
interests of those who commission it. In such an understanding, mathwashing 
appears to be a dangerous ideology. When people trust the neutrality of power-
saturated tools that serve particular interests, they are stripped of their ability to 
question the results. This “erasure of doubt” is deeply problematic.35 
C. Symptom-Oriented Policing: The Paradox of Prediction 
This line of criticism is the most fundamental. It attacks PPTs for their 
conservatism and for treating only symptoms, not causes. Generalizations, and 
thus predictions, are made by statistically analyzing data from the past. 
Therefore, under this line of criticism, PPT can only be “reactionary.” It relies on 
stability while reproducing that stability through its self-reinforcing effects.36 It is 
a technology designed to identify effects, sequences, and correlations. It is not a 
technology designed to identify and change causes, because if it did, it would stop 
working. After all, if the basis on which PPTs operate changes, then the 
assumptions from the past that are used as the foundation for its analysis  no 
longer applies. We call this the paradox of predictive policing: once it produces 
significant changes in criminal behavior patterns, it loses its power. 
This shortcoming, namely the inability of this kind of technology to deal with 
instability or change, has been well demonstrated recently by AI systems used for 
marketing, inventory management, or fraud detection.37 They failed to deal with 
rapidly changing consumer behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic.38 Machine 
 
TECHNICAL.LY (June 8, 2016), https://technical.ly/brooklyn/2016/06/08/fred-benenson-mathwashing-
facebook-data-worship/ [https://perma.cc/4JR5-MPX] (“Mathwashing can be thought of using math 
terms (algorithm, model, etc.) to paper over a more subjective reality. For example, a lot of people 
believed Facebook was using an unbiased algorithm to determine its trending topics, even if Facebook 
had previously admitted that humans were involved in the process.”). 
 34.  See generally David Beer, The Social Power of Algorithms, 20 INFO., COMM. & SOC. (2017); Rob 
Kitchin, Thinking Critically about and Researching Algorithms, 20 INFO., COMM. & SOC. (2017). 
 35.  See Louise Amoore, Doubt and the Algorithm: On the Partial Accounts of Machine Learning, 36 
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC. 1, 1–23 (2019) (analyzing the status of doubt in humans in view of its 
calculability in machines). 
 36.  See PERRY, supra note 4, at 674–92. 
 37.  Thilo Hagendorff & Katharina Wezel, 15 Challenges for AI: or What AI (currently) Can’t Do, 
35 AI & SOC. 355, 355–65 (2019). 
 38.  Will Douglas Heaven, Our Weird Behavior During the Pandemic Is Messing with AI Models, 
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learning models work well with “normal” or “stable” behavior, but irregularities 
throw automated systems off their game. In policing, this is unacceptable. After 
all, for PPT to be socially valuable, positive change, such as safer and fairer 
communities, must be part of its goal. If this change occurs gradually, then the 
PPT systems must be constantly updated and fed with new data. However, this 
service is not often part of the contracts between police stations and the private 
companies that are selling the software. 
 
IV 
MACHINE LEARNING-BASED PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME: 
OVERLAPS OF THE CRITIQUE? 
AI-based prosecution of organized crime seems to be the logical next step to 
predictive policing techniques. While predictive policing techniques addresses 
incidents of violent or well-reported, visible forms of crimes, AI-based 
prosecution of organized crime is focused on identifying criminal networks and 
structures. Having discussed the major points of criticism regarding PPTs in Part 
III, we now scrutinize whether those same criticisms hold true for AI-based 
criminal prosecution techniques targeted at organized crime. We are aware of the 
fact that a difference exists between predicting and detecting crime. While 
prediction aims at prevention, detection aims at conviction. Hence, tools for 
predictive policing and criminal prosecution may in part follow different 
dynamics. This becomes obvious when keeping in mind that algorithmic 
predictions deal with the possible state of affairs, while prosecution aims at 
uncovering facts. However, as mentioned before, it would be a mistake to treat 
both fields completely separately, because PPTs are also about solving past 
crimes. 
It is true that most of the criticism directed at PPTs addresses the 
uncertainties associated with the act of predicting the future. AI-based law 
enforcement tools, however, are not fact-finding assistants, but rather “fact 
reconstructors.” These tools do not only follow probabilistic methods. They also 
incorporate subjective decisions that result from the technical measures used in 
crime analysis. This is the connecting link, the probabilistic as well as subjective 
logic that is either used to unveil potential future crimes or to infer unknown 
attributes of past crimes.  Ultimately, both fields deal with uncertainty in law 
enforcement, so it makes sense to look for overlaps in the criticism. 
But despite the similarities between the two fields, there are also differences. 
While PPTs target violent or well-reported crimes (including in the case of crime 
series detection), organized crime-oriented law enforcement tools seek to 
unravel complex structures of interconnected, covert activity by multiple 
 
MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 26, 2020, 2:44 PM), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/11/1001563/covid-
pandemic-broken-ai-machine-learning-amazon-retail-fraud-humans-in-the-loop/ 
[https://perma.cc/9PYT-UCLP] (describing how changing behavior routines due to COVID-19 impact 
the reliability of algorithmic decision making). 
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offenders and intricate, sometimes international, social networks. While 
predictive policing techniques on overt crime can build on a trove of well-
populated databases of past police records, organized crime prosecution success 
rates have been extremely low, mostly due to a lack of available data. Therefore, 
AI-based law enforcement targeting organized crime must inductively infer 
unknown information based on heterogeneous mass data. It also must respond 
to real world limitations, such as by producing and using synthetic data to train 
algorithms where real-life data is unavailable.  This is where machine learning 
comes into play. 
The initial situation is that police departments are collecting more and more 
data traces about organized crime suspects. This unstructured data comes from, 
among others, seized smartphones, hard drives, lawful wiretaps and the like. 
These resources yield, for example, data on call logs, call duration, and cellular 
geo-information. In addition to this metadata, the authorities can also make use 
of simple audio data. If this data comes from wiretaps at locations where multiple 
people are present and speaking at the same time, different speakers can be 
separated and verified, and noise can be eliminated. Frequent targets are also 
cars, from which geodata is obtained. In addition, image and video files are of 
interest. Here, among other things, time stamps, geodata or information on the 
camera model are evaluated. By means of facial recognition techniques as well 
as other methods for checking biometric features, persons depicted can be 
identified, and various features can be determined, including their age and 
gender, whether they are wearing glasses, or whether they have “micro features” 
such as patches and tattoos. In addition, pieces of luggage or vehicle types can be 
evaluated. Furthermore, text files are evaluated with regard to their type, source, 
time stamp, and mentioned persons, places, or objects. Also, forensic text analysis 
is used to evaluate the semantics in confession letters, extortion letters, or hate 
mail, which can ultimately lead to probabilistic findings about the respective 
authors. 
Information extracted from text, audio, images, graph structures, and other 
visual representations can be used to create representations designed to uncover 
crime connections. Systems translate unstructured big data into visualizations of 
suspected criminal structures. To begin with, seized smartphones, hard drives, 
and other data sources are transformed into a graphical interface that provides 
an overview of relevant individuals, their relationships, role assignments in the 
organized crime context, whereabouts, residences, headquarters and the like. 
These insights are further supplemented with open-source intelligence data 
obtained using tools such as web crawlers, meaning a bot that is systematically 
browsing the Internet. Ultimately, police software should make it easier to 
identify person-related “micro features” in heterogeneous data, extract 
relationships between people and places, and it should include timeline 
functionality that puts relevant events in chronological order. In summary, 
machine learning helps data preparation by converting audio files to text, 
translating text files, or extracting geospatial information from data. It helps in 
relevance assessments regarding the importance of certain data traces. Also, 
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machine learning is used to connect the dots to find recurring identifiers across 
different types of data traces. Finally, it is used to generate criminal hypotheses, 
for example by generating motion profiles of suspects, social networks of relevant 
individuals, or other visual representations for police officers. 
A. Difficult Data 
AI-based prosecution software can suffer from machine bias due to 
problematic biases in data, just like PPTs. Machine biases may for instance be an 
issue when generating synthetic data.39 With synthetic data we here refer to data 
that is artificial, fictitious, yet realistic and which is generated by generative 
adversarial networks. Its purpose is to provide additional training data where real 
historic data are sparse or where available data cannot be used for reasons of 
privacy protection. For organized crime, synthetic data is sometimes the only 
choice not just to avoid reproducing racism baked in to past crime data or to 
circumvent privacy issues but also because available data on organized crime is 
sparse compared to small-scale or obviously violent offenses. Many areas of 
organized crime are still “dark fields”, which can be shown via statistics for 
instance from Germany, where only very few investigation procedures are 
conducted.40 Until today, few cases have been resolved. 
Further complicating matters, organized crime is very context and culture 
specific, and patterns are therefore hard to generalize: they differ not only 
between organizations, but—due to chapter-like structure of most criminal 
organizations—also between regions within the same organization.41 However, a 
sufficient amount of heterogenous data on past offenses must be available in 
order to train machine learning models. Therefore, apart from synthetic data, 
other sources of big data need to be taken into account. 
The larger the data sets, the more possibilities can be considered. Apart from 
raising privacy issues, data taken from CCTV, social media, or other kinds of 
unstructured big data can bring its own problems. This kind of data can be both 
a blessing and a curse, as data sets can contain dirty or biased data as well as data 
with low accuracy. They can lead to spurious correlations that make it difficult to 
identify the “needles in the haystack” alongside criminally irrelevant 
information. 
The data-collecting apparatuses generally capture what is easy to ensnare, 
meaning data that are made easily available or data that are a by-product of a 
 
 39.  See Sachit Menon, Alexander Damian, Shijia Hu, Nikhil Ravi & Cynthia Rudin, PULSE: Self-
Supervised Photo Upsampling via Latent Space Exploration of Generative Models. In ARXIV: 
2003.03808V3, 1–20 (2020) (discussing the potential of biases in techniques for generating synthetic, high-
resolution, realistic images). 
 40.  Bundeskriminalamt, Organisierte Kriminalität. Bundeslagebild 2019, BUNDESKRIMINALAMT 
(Nov. 25, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen 
/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/OrganisierteKriminalitaet/organisierteKriminalitaetBundeslagebild2019
.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 [https://perma.cc/PX2A-VTAK]. 
 41.  See Letizia Paoli, The Paradoxes of Organized Crime, 37 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 51, 51–97 
(2002) (arguing that most criminal organization can not be reduced to illegal market activities). 
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primary output.42 Policing software that relies on unstructured big data does so 
by repurposing different types of data that were initially created as a by-product 
of a random activity, like riding a car or using a phone.43 Hence, the logic of the 
data collection and analyses determines the way prosecution methods are shaped. 
Individuals become suspects because they occupy a certain position in artificial 
sociograms or in spatial patterns or because they are affected by other (arbitrary) 
correlations. Here, form can be mistaken for substance. That is not to say that 
machine learning cannot be a useful tool in making sense from large datasets on 
past crimes, quite the contrary. It can lead to insights that were previously 
impossible to achieve. But these insights must be interpreted with the mentioned 
methodological shortcomings, as well as privacy issues, in mind. 
B. Opacity and Authority Conflicts 
Machine learning-based crime analysis tools are opaque, just like any other 
machine learning-technique whose interpretability (the degree of human 
comprehensibility) and explainability (the understanding of criteria for 
decisions) are significantly restricted.44 To solve explainability issues, 
visualization techniques are being used in order to make computational 
operations and outputs understandable for humans. But that process can further 
obfuscate the complexity and initial contextuality of what actually happened.45 
Besides visualization, opacity results from the statistical methods that are in use 
and the combinations thereof.46 
In many areas of organized crime analysis, techniques for dimensionality 
reduction are put to use.47 Heterogenous data are at the same time often high-
dimensional data, hence data points have to be rendered understandable for 
humans, who can only interpret two, three, or maybe four-dimensional plots. 
Even if descriptive data analysis tools for dimensionality reduction increase 
interpretability while trying to minimize information loss, some loss is 
unavoidable. This can happen for instance by conflating several categories (such 
as similar crime cases) into one. Of course, domain and implicit knowledge are 
used when doing so, but, as outlined in Part III, one has to assume that most 
 
 42.  Rob Kitchin & Tracey P. Lauriault, Small Data in the Era of Big Data, 80 GEOJOURNAL 463, 
463–75 (2015). 
 43.  See Klara Dološ, Conrad Meyer, Andreas Attenberger & Jessica Steinberger, Driver 
Identification Using In-Vehicle Digital Data in the Forensic Context of a Hit and Run Accident, 35 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: DIGIT. INVEST. 1 (2020). 
 44.  Brent Mittelstadt, Chris Russell & Sandra Wachter, Explaining Explanations in AI 1–10 (Conf. 
on Fairness, Accountability & Transparency, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3278331 [https://perma.cc/2L6W-BXUV]. 
 45.  See Matthias Leese, ‘Seeing Futures:’ Politics of Visuality and Affect, in ALGORITHMIC LIFE: 
CALCULATIVE DEVICES IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 143, 143–158 (Louise Amoore & Volha Piotukh 
eds., 2016) (describing how difficult it is to to make sense of data-driven environments). 
 46.  Tasks like speech pattern recognition or visual analytics are tackled via recurrent neural nets or 
Transformers, but also classic methods like decision trees or k-nearest neighbor algorithms. 
 47.  Principal component analysis or t-SNE, but also other methods like UMAP for clustering, or 
multidimensional scaling. 
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criminal analysts are not familiar with the complex technical processes that went 
into the tools that are supposed to assist them. 
All in all, the vast majority of machine learning-methods that are currently 
used for tackling organized crime are black boxes, meaning their interpretability 
and transparency are non-existent or rather low. In this regard, it might be better 
to create simpler models that are interpretable in the first place and that in some 
cases can achieve the same degree of accuracy, instead of using more complex 
algorithms that lack interpretability.48 But current approaches to AI-based 
detection of organized crime work mainly with unstructured big data sets, which 
greatly complicate the use of interpretable machine learning. Therefore, 
presently, end-to-end learning is the way to go—where brute-force-like 
techniques are used until the networks perform as required, skipping over more 
pipelined architectures where each module has to be tuned. This renders the 
machine learning-models hard or impossible to validate. 
Moreover, modifying the system by applying structural changes 
retrospectively is impossible without starting the training from scratch. 
Ultimately, while some choices may be trivial, for instance deciding whether a 
task can be solved via regression or classification, other design choices for 
machine learning architectures can have far-reaching consequences that must be 
considered when applying respective software solutions to real-world policing. 
There is “no free lunch.”49 Especially for unsupervised learning tasks, it is not just 
difficult to find the right algorithm in order to be able to interpret data 
meaningfully; the choice of algorithms can also have significant backlashes 
against the course of criminal investigations.50 
Furthermore, criticizing the effects of mathwashing does not only make sense 
in the context of PPTs, but also with regard to organized crime-oriented systems. 
Both come with the semblance of a flawless, objectively functioning, neutral, and 
value-free machine, while the opposite may be true.51 Pattern-based policing 
strategies become an epistemological authority where the data doubles of 
suspects can seem more real than the actual person behind it.52 Moreover, 
machines are far away from grasping non-rational, spontaneously-working 
human systems in all their complexity. Software developers and advocates must 
acknowledge that large parts of organized crime are riddled with unforeseeable 
circumstances like clan feuds, stock market fluctuations, health-crises, natural 
 
 48.  See Cynthia Rudin, Stop Explaining Black Box Machine Learning Models for High Stakes 
Decisions and Use Interpretable Models Instead, 1 NATURE MACHINE INTEL. 206, 206–15 (2019). 
 49.  See David H. Wolpert, William G. Macready, No Free Lunch Theorem for Optimization, 1 IEEE 
TRANS. ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 67 (1997). 
 50.  See David H. Wolpert, William G. Macready, No Free Lunch Theorem for Optimization, 1 IEEE 
TRANS. ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 67, 67–82 (1997) (discussing “the dangers of comparing 
algorithms by their performance on a small sample of problems” and of selecting algorithms without 
“incorporating problem-specific knowledge”). 
 51.  TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 18, at 287. 
 52.  See Maria Los, Looking Into the Future: Surveillance, Globalization and the Totalitarian 
Potential, in THEORIZING SURVEILLANCE: THE PANOPTICON AND BEYOND 69, 69–94 (David Lyon ed., 
2006) (exploring the totalitarian potential of modern forms of surveillance). 
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disasters, internal agreements, individual affects and emotions, and others. 
One must keep in mind that the kinds of insights from prosecution software 
are determined by decisions taken by software manufacturers and programmers. 
It is not just training data that introduces problematic bias into software, but also 
individual presuppositions. Here, these presuppositions concern criminal 
behavioral patterns, for instance, theories on repeating victimizations, movement 
patterns, the relevance of certain nodes in social networks, methods for 
dimensionality reduction, and more. But as soon as these subjective 
presuppositions are “filtered” through a complex machine, they vanish in favor 
of computer outputs that come along with a sheer undoubted epistemological 
authority. This can cause police officers to come under pressure when they do 
not follow machine decisions but want to stick to deviating intuitions in going 
after certain clues in the process of criminal prosecution. 
Although AI-based policing tools are generally termed “assistance systems,” 
the relationship between machine assistant and sovereign could reverse, 
rendering police detectives to mere assistants of machine decisions. This effect is 
akin to defensive decision-making.53 In an increasingly data-driven policing 
culture, police officers and other officials sometimes deliberately make 
suboptimal decisions by following machine outputs to protect themselves against 
negative consequences or to secure themselves against redress claims in case 
something goes wrong. Especially in organized crime, expertise and experience 
are important because organized crime contains complex socio-cultural factors. 
Consequently, investigations should not be subjugated to algorithmic authority.  
C. Symptom-Oriented Policing 
Last but not least, PPTs are criticized for only addressing symptoms of crime 
and not its causes. This is where organized crime-oriented law enforcement tools 
come to the fore. They certainly carry the potential to make criminal networks 
visible, to detect suspicious irregularities, and to identify complex criminal 
operations whose isolated acts are not conspicuous in themselves because their 
criminal background only becomes apparent when viewed in the larger context. 
But do they really address the root causes? Law enforcement techniques based 
on the analysis of unstructured Big Data seem to aim at finding causal inferences 
for criminal acts, but they too operate within a “post-Newtonian 
technorationality,”54 just like PPTs. This technorationality follows a logic of 
tinkering, exploring ways to create patterns of correlations in the data. 
 
 53.  See Rocio Garcia-Retamero & Mirta Galesic, On Defensive Decision Making: How Doctors 
Make Decisions for Their Patients, 17 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 664, 664–69 (2014); see also Florian M. 
Artinger, Sabrina Artinger & Gerd Gigerenzer, C. Y. A.: Frequency and Causes of Defensive Decisions 
in Public Administration, 12 BUS. RESEARCH 9, 9–25 (2013). 
 54.  See Jutta Weber, Keep Adding. On Kill Lists, Drone Warfare and the Politics of Databases, 34 
ENV’T. & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE 107, 107–25 (2016) (“In contrast to modern scientific rationality, 
[post-Newtonian technorationality] is not interested in the analysis of intrinsic properties of entities 
(organisms, machines) but focuses instead on their behaviour, on their (inter)relations and on possible 
recombination of modules, fragments of code and building blocks of systems.”).  
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Postrelational databases, which form the basis for law enforcement searches, shift 
police work away from directly observed clues or causal assessments of specific 
events toward a “politics of possibility,” in which algorithmic compilations 
generate uncertainties that must be combined in ways that are just good enough 
to be valid or court-proof for legal purposes.55 The challenge is that, because of 
the complexity of organized crime, robust evidence is rarely found in isolated 
data sets, but suspicions must be derived by combining different data sets or data 




There is no doubt that AI-based police systems promise much potential for 
solving criminal cases. But they suffer from a fundamental paradox: In order to 
function, they depend on stability, otherwise the projection of knowledge from 
the past into the present or future would not work. The dependence on stability 
makes them very costly to apply meaningfully in dynamic fields. In these dynamic 
fields, they only work if they are constantly updated. But this is rarely the case 
because it requires a constant stream of new data, which moreover must be 
constantly priced into the system. This is very labor-intensive. Therefore, most 
systems work best in practice when patterns remain stable. But one of the central 
goals of smart policing should be to break up entrenched structures in order to 
end destructive spirals of poverty, corruption, and crime. To resolve this paradox 
of current AI-based policing, solutions are needed that make technical systems 
less dependent on past crime records and more compatible with causal reasoning. 
In this way, they could help identify, understand, and address the complex 
relationships and structures that put people in situations that lead them to 
commit crime in the first place. 
At present, most tools are targeted at combating well-reported forms of overt, 
violent, or petty crime that are easy to detect and obviously definable in 
themselves as a criminal act. Organized crime, however, operates in hidden, 
complex structures. These structures consist of a combination of corruption, 
money laundering, and the infiltration of cultural traditions, local and 
international politics, and business.56 In order to prove anything within these 
structures, a wide variety of data sets must be combined and put into relation 
with each other in order to detect not only patterns but also suspicious 
irregularities and coalitions of people. Because these are complex tasks that 
require knowledge in various fields including culture, law and politics, human 
experts are still urgently needed for this, and preferably those familiar with both 
criminal structures and machine learning technologies. 
 
 55.  See generally LOUISE AMOORE, THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY: RISK AND SECURITY BEYOND 
PROBABILITY (2013). 
 56.  Interpol, Global Strategy on Organized and Emerging Crime, INTERPOL GENERAL 
SECRETARIAT, 1–4 (2017). 
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To sum up: In order to support a kind of policing that goes beyond the 
stability-reliant, self-reinforcing and symptom-based logic of predictive policing, 
heterogeneous data and profound human expertise are the keys. Thereby, it must 
be ensured that individual and group privacy is protected, as well as 
discriminatory bias avoided, in both the data sets and the features used for the 
models to train the algorithms. In doing so, a policing and programming culture 
is needed where practitioners and developers are working together in close 
collaboration and where practitioners are not competing with the machines they 
are using, but where these machines are really serving them as assistants in the 
literal sense. This, however, is only possible when the value of doubt is being 
cultivated and not undermined by mathwashing ideologies. Even though these 
may sound to be unrealistic demands, they are nevertheless all necessary to 
facilitate an application of AI which would make policing truly “smart.” 
